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1. Introduction
In the last decade, a large and influential literature has documented the negative effect of
community heterogeneity on the level of trust across metropolitan areas in the United States.
Existing studies show, in particular, that individuals have lower levels of trust when they live in
racially fragmented and income unequal communities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Costa and
Kahn, 2003; Putnam, 2007). These findings have spurred a public debate about the workings
of the American melting pot (e.g. Henninger, 2007; Jonas, 2007; Armour, 2003) and the debate
is likely to continue as racial diversity in the U.S. will increase further.1
This paper reconsiders the existing evidence and emphasizes a neglected aspect of commu-
nity heterogeneity that turns out to be important: the income inequality between racial groups.
I show that racial income inequality is key for understanding the different levels of trust across
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA henceforth) in the United States.2 My empirical work
starts out by showing that racial fragmentation and overall income inequality have a statisti-
cally significant, negative effect on individual measures of trust, a result that is consistent with
previous findings (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). But I then find that these
effects become statistically insignificant once I account for income inequality between racial
groups. Hence, my empirical results indicate that it is not income inequality or racial fragmen-
tation per se that reduce the level of trust in metropolitan areas. Instead, what turns out to be
key for the level of trust is the concurrence of differences in race and income.
My estimates show that individuals living in communities characterized by greater racial in-
come inequality have lower levels of trust. The estimated coefficients imply that a one standard
deviation increase in racial income inequality is associated with a reduction in the average level
of trust in the community of 2.8 percentage points, or 7% of its mean value. I also show that
racial income inequality has a more detrimental effect in more racially fragmented communi-
ties and that minority groups reduce trust more than the majority group when racial income
inequality increases. These results are robust to alternative definitions of racial diversity and
alternative treatments of the time dimension. The results also prevail when I instrument racial
income inequality with historical levels of cotton production in each MSA. Hence, the negative
effect of racial income inequality on trust does not appear to be driven by reverse causation
from low (interracial) trust to high inequality of average incomes across racial groups.
I consider two alternative explanations for my results. The first emphasizes the more intense
competition induced by racial income inequality for access to valuable but limited resources,
such as public education and welfare. This may foster prejudices and social stereotypes against
competing others, ultimately reducing the overall level of trust in the community. The second
explanation, instead, focuses on the well-documented preference for similarity of individuals,
1According to U.S. Census projections, by the year 2050 racial minorities will outnumber non-Hispanic Whites
(Ortman and Guarneri, 2009).
2MSAs are defined by the US Federal Office of Management and Budget as geographic entities containing a core
urban area of 50,000 or more population and consisting of one or more counties.
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and the associated tendency to trust more those who are akin to themselves. While this ten-
dency exists regardless of the context, the more frequent exposure to people of different race
and socio-economic background leads individuals in more racially unequal communities to
trust other people less, on average. I use individual-level data to try to distinguish between
these two explanations and find empirical support only for the latter, based on the assump-
tion of preference for similarity. This motivates the last part of the paper, where I qualify this
assumption by showing, in particular, that racial income inequality reduces trust only if the
preference for similarity of the individuals is non-linear, with trust falling at increasing rates
towards those who are different both in race and income.
To estimate empirically the impact of income disparities between racial groups I measure
income inequality with the Theil index (Theil, 1967). The main advantage of the Theil index
over other measures of income inequality, such as the Gini index, is that it is perfectly decom-
posable.3 This means that it is possible to distinguish the between-groups inequality, due to
income differences between racial groups, from the within-groups inequality, due to income
differences among individuals of the same racial group. This allows me to first estimate the
effect of overall income inequality on trust in different metropolitan areas, and then decom-
pose this aggregate effect into the effects deriving from inequality between racial groups and
inequality within racial groups.
Figure 1.A illustrates some of my main empirical findings using data on average trust and
measures of community heterogeneity across U.S. metropolitan areas. Panel (A) plots the
average level of trust for MSA over the period 1973-2010, against their average level of racial
fragmentation. Panel (B) plots it against their average level of income inequality. Both panels
confirm the existence of an inverse relation between trust and the measures of community
heterogeneity, as documented in the literature. The graph, however, also illustrates that racial
fragmentation and income inequality alone cannot fully account for the difference in average
trust levels between similar cities, like San Francisco and Houston. In spite of their very similar
level of community heterogeneity, citizens in the two cities report different levels of trust: while
40% of those living in San Francisco say they can trust others, only 31% in Houston do so.
The explicit focus on racial income inequality provides an explanation for this difference.
Figure 1.B plots on the horizontal axis the between-groups component of income inequality
measured by the Theil index. The graph shows that the two cities are actually very different
in this dimension. The share of overall inequality that is due to differences among races is
twice as large in Houston as in San Francisco. This in turn seems to affect the level of trust
in the two communities. In San Francisco, where the probability of meeting an individual of
a different race but similar income level is relatively high, the level of trust is higher than in
Houston, where belonging to a different race is also likely to be associated with a difference
in income. The same pattern of apparent similarity, which is in reality masking an additional
3The Gini index is perfectly decomposable only in the special case where the richest individual of one group is
poorer than the poorest of the other.
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dimension of heterogeneity, is repeated over different pairs of MSA. My analysis will thus
focus on documenting this pattern in a systematic way.
The results in this paper are related to the literature on the determinants of trust. Trust is
considered one of the fundamental aspects of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993,
1995; Fukuyama, 1996), and several empirical studies have explored its influence on economic
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Algan and Cahuc, 2010), financial
development (Guiso et al., 2004), trade (Guiso et al., 2009) and institutional quality (Knack,
2002).
In economics, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) were the first to emphasize the negative effect
of community heterogeneity on trust, showing that greater racial fragmentation and income
inequality are associated with lower levels of trust in U.S. metropolitan areas. Between the
two measures of heterogeneity, they find racial fragmentation to be more strongly (negatively)
associated with trust, concluding that people are more likely to trust others in an economically
unequal city rather than in a racially fragmented one. Similar results have been documented for
the U.S. by Costa and Kahn (2003) and Putnam (2007), and by Leigh (2006) and Gustavsson
and Jordahl (2008) for Australia and Sweden, respectively. Dinesen and Sonderskov (2014)
show that the negative effect of racial heterogeneity on trust becomes even stronger in the
immediate micro-context (within a radius of 80 meters of a given household).4 A related strand
of the literature finds a negative relationship between racial fragmentation, income inequality
and other dimensions of social capital, such as group participation (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2000), civic engagement (Vigdor, 2004) and public good provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Goldin
and Katz, 1999). I complement these studies by showing that the key correlate of trust is the
level of racial income inequality, which can be seen as an indicator of the concurrence of the
two dimensions of heterogeneity emphasized in previous work.
A related theoretical literature (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Tabellini, 2008) provides an-
alytical support for the negative relationship between community heterogeneity and measures
of social capital observed in the data. The fundamental assumption of these models is that
individuals prefer similarity - a long-held belief in psychology and sociology (Lazarsfeld and
Merton, 1954; Coleman, 1988) - and derive a lower utility from matching with others that are
different in race or income. This implies that in equilibrium heterogeneous communities are
characterized by lower levels of cooperation, participation and trust. I consider an extension to
this framework, allowing individuals to differ in more than one dimension, both in race and in-
come, in order to study the conditions under which the assumption of preference for similarity
is consistent with my empirical results.
While studies of trust and social capital formation have not investigated the role of racial
income inequality, other strands of the literature have done so. Alesina et al. (2015), for ex-
4While most empirical studies support the notion that diversity erodes trust, alternative perspectives - most no-
tably Allport’s 1954 contact theory - exist. Contact theory suggests that diversity fosters interethnic tolerance
and social solidarity, and predicts that diversity should increase trust. Supporting studies for this argument
include (Marschall and Stolle, 2004; Stolle et al., 2008).
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ample, find a negative relationship between ethnic inequality and regional development and
public good provision in Africa. Their results are consistent with previous studies of social
conflict, which emphasize the role of racial income inequality in triggering political animosity,
leading to several inefficient political and economic outcomes, including social turmoil (Abu-
Lughod, 2007), violent crime (Blau and Blau, 1982) and ethnic violence (Robinson, 2001;
Stewart, 2005). The negative relationship between ethnic inequality and public good provision
in Alesina et al. (2015) is also in line with explanations of the redistribution gap between U.S.
and Europe (Alesina and Glaeser, 2005), and adds micro-based evidence to studies document-
ing the lower public good provision in countries with larger racial disparities (Baldwin and
Huber, 2010).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the estimation framework.
Section 3 discusses the main results and robustness checks. Section 4 investigates two alterna-
tive interpretations of the results and derives further testable implications, which are discussed
formally in Appendix A. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and Estimation Framework
2.1. Data
The main source of data in this study is the General Social Survey (GSS henceforth) for
the years 1973-2010.5 In each round, the GSS interviews about 1,500 individuals on a broad
range of topics, including demographic, behavioural and attitudinal questions. The sample is
built to be nationally representative, with primary sampling units represented by MSA and non-
metropolitan counties stratified by region, age and race before selection (King and Richards,
1972). My main dependent variable, the measure of trust, is obtained from the following ques-
tion: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?”. I code as 1 individuals who answer “most people can
be trusted”, while those who answer “most people can’t be trusted” or “it depends” are coded
as 0. Respondents who report to trust others are 38% of the total.6 The individual character-
istics used in the estimation are also obtained from the GSS. These include variables on age,
education, race, religion, gender, family income, working conditions, marital status, size of the
place of residence and a dummy for the race of the respondent. The upper panel of Table 1
reports summary statistics for these variables. From the GSS Sensitive Data files I identify the
metropolitan areas in which the respondents live, in order to match them with the measures
5The GSS was conducted yearly during the period 1972-1994, and every other year ever since. In three years
(1979, 1981, 1992) the survey was not conducted. Individuals interviewed in 1972 are not included in the
sample, due to lack of information about the MSA they live in.
6Respondents who answer that “it depends” represent less than 5% of the total. Alternative coding assigning the
intermediate category to the group of individuals who trust does not alter the results. Similarly, dropping the
intermediate group altogether does not change the results.
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of community heterogeneity calculated at the MSA level.7 The respondents come from 110
different MSA, listed in Appendix Table A1. Since the GSS is built to be nationally represen-
tative, many MSA (typically the smallest ones in terms of population) are only sampled in few
rounds, and then replaced with comparable ones. Appendix Table A1 reports the number of
years in which each MSA has been sampled as well as the total number of respondents for each
MSA.
The measures of community heterogeneity are obtained from the Integrated Public Use Mi-
crodata Series (IPUMS) 1% sample of the US Census for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000.
Racial fragmentation is measured using a Herfindahl-type of index that captures the proba-
bility that two randomly drawn individuals in a MSA belong to different races. The index is
increasing in heterogeneity and is defined as:
RacFrm = 1−∑
r
S2rm (1)
where m indicates the MSA and r are race definitions which closely approximate the U.S.
Census categories of 1990: (i) Whites non-Hispanic; (ii) Blacks non-Hispanic; (iii) Asian and
Pacific Islander; (iv) Native American; (v) Hispanic.8 The term Srm represents the share of race
r in the MSA. The mean MSA in my sample has a heterogeneity index of 0.403 with a standard
deviation of 0.171. In order to maximize the comparability with previous studies (Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002), I also include in the regressions an index of ethnic fragmentation, calculated
in a way analogous to the racial fragmentation index but using ethnic origin rather than race.
The original Census breakdown for ethnicity, reporting 35 categories of countries of origin, is
aggregated into 10 main categories in order to avoid giving the same weight to very similar and
very different ethnicities.
I use two alternative measures of income inequality: the Gini index and the Theil index. The
latter belongs to the generalized entropy class of inequality measures 9, it is bounded between 0
and 1 and measures the distance between the egalitarian state in which everybody has the same
income, and the actual income distribution. Operationally, the Theil index is defined as:
T heilm =∑
r
∑
i
yirm
Ym
ln
( yirm
Ym
1
Nm
)
(2)
where m indicates the MSA and r the race of belonging. Thus, yirm is the income of individual
i belonging to racial group r in MSA m, Ym is total income in the MSA, and Nm is the total
population in the MSA.
7More than two thirds of GSS respondents can be associated to their MSA. 39% of those who can be matched
have missing data for trust. Cross availability with the individual characteristics of the respondents determines
the final baseline sample of 20,056 individuals.
8The classification follows Iceland (2004) and Alesina et al. (2004).
9In particular, it corresponds to the generalized entropy index for a value of the parameter of distributional
sensitivity α equal to 1.
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As discussed in Bourguignon (1979) and Shorrocks (1980), the indices of the generalized
entropy class are the only ones that satisfy the decomposability property.10 By virtue of this,
the Theil index can be rewritten as:
T heilm =∑
r
yrm
Ym
[
∑
i
yirm
yrm
ln
( yirm
yrm
1
nrm
)]
+∑
r
yrm
Ym
ln
( yrm
Ym
nrm
Nm
)
(3)
where all components are defined as in equation (2), with the addition of yrm, which represents
the income of racial group r, and nrm which is the population of racial group r. In this form,
the index explicitly compares the income and population distributions of different subgroups
by summing the weighted logarithm of the ratio between their income and population shares.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) represents the amount of total inequality
that is due to differences within racial groups, while the second represents the amount that is
due to differences between racial groups. Focusing on the latter term, it is easy to see that if one
racial group has the same income and population shares it does not contribute to the between-
groups inequality of the MSA. On the contrary, if its income share is bigger (smaller) than its
population share, the group contributes positively (negatively) to the between-groups inequal-
ity. Weighting by the income share of each racial group ensures that the positive contributions
are always higher than the negative, so that the between-groups inequality term is always pos-
itive. A similar logic applies to the inequality within racial groups: if one of the n individuals
of a racial group earns 1/n-th of the total group income, his contribution to the within-groups
inequality is equal to zero. If he earns more (less) than that, his contribution is positive (nega-
tive). As in the previous case, weighting by the income share of each individual ensures that the
within-groups inequality term is always positive. Altogether, the Theil index thus evaluates the
discrepancy between the distribution of income and the distribution of population both within
and between different groups.
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the measures of community
heterogeneity, while Table 2 highlights their correlations. The most notable feature is the very
high correlation (0.98) between the aggregate Theil index (the sum of the two components of
between-groups and within-groups inequality) and the Gini index. This suggests that there
is no additional information conveyed by the Theil index per se. Instead, its merit lies in its
decomposability, which allows to account explicitly for the component of inequality due to
differences between racial groups. Other relevant features of the table are the high correla-
tion between the index of racial fragmentation and the between-groups inequality, as well as
the negative correlation between the measure of trust and all measures of community hetero-
geneity. The measures of heterogeneity are interpolated linearly through one Census year and
another, as in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Costa and Kahn (2003). By construction,
10In order to satisfy the decomposability property, the measure of inequality should have an elementary consis-
tency property: an increase in inequality in every subgroup of the population should be associated with an
increase in the overall inequality index. This condition is not satisfied by the Gini index (Cowell, 2000).
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the interpolation introduces serial correlation in the estimates. To account for this, I cluster the
standard errors at the MSA level in all regressions, allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary
correlation in the error term. In section 3 I investigate the robustness of my results to alternative
treatments of the time dimension.
2.2. Estimation framework
I start by considering the impact of community heterogeneity on trust of individual i in
metropolitan area m according to the following specification:
Trimt = β1Ximt +β2RacFrmt +β3Ineqmt +δ1Zmt +αs(m)t + τt + εimt (4)
where Ximt is the vector of individual characteristics reported in Table 1. Zmt is a set of com-
munity characteristics including the logarithm of the median income of each racial group in the
MSA (and its squared term), the logarithm of the MSA size and the index of ethnic fragmen-
tation. RacFrmt is the measure of racial fragmentation and Ineqmt is the measure of aggregate
income inequality (calculated either by the Gini or by the Theil index). αs(m)t and τt are state
and year fixed effects. Finally, εimt is an error term that is clustered at the MSA level to allow
for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
In order to identify the impact of racial income inequality on trust, I then expand the previous
specification to separately estimate the effect of between- and within-groups inequality. This is
done in the following regression:
Trimt = β˜1Ximt + β˜2RacFrmt + γ1BtwIneqmt + γ2WthIneqmt + δ˜1Zmt +αs(m)t + τt +ηimt (5)
where all variables are defined as above, with the exception of BtwIneqmt which is the inequal-
ity between racial groups and WthIneqmt which is the inequality within racial groups. As in the
previous equation, the error term is clustered at the MSA level. The main coefficient of interest
is γ1, which captures the effect of greater racial income inequality on trust. In addition, I will be
interested in observing the variation of the coefficient of racial fragmentation (from β2 to β˜2)
once the inequality between races is explicitly accounted for. The method of estimation in the
baseline specification is least squares (LS). In section 3.2 I instrument the measures of racial
income inequality and racial fragmentation and estimate two-stage least squares regressions
(IV).11
11Estimating the model by Probit as in previous studies (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Costa and Kahn, 2003)
provides qualitatively identical results.
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3. Empirical Results
3.1. Least squares estimation
Table 3 reports the estimates of the effect of community heterogeneity on trust for the period
1973-2010. I start by introducing the measures of community heterogeneity one at a time.
Columns (1) and (2) show that both racial fragmentation and income inequality (measured by
the Gini index) are negatively and significantly correlated with trust at the 99% confidence level.
The estimated coefficients are remarkably similar to those found by Alesina and La Ferrara
(2002) for the period 1974-1994. The point estimate for racial fragmentation implies that,
moving from the least to the most racially fragmented MSA the probability of trusting others
decreases by 16 percentage points. Starting from the sample mean, a one standard deviation
increase in racial fragmentation reduces trust by 3.7 percentage points, or 10% of the sample
mean. Similarly, the coefficient of income inequality implies that a one standard deviation
increase is associated with a reduction of trust of 9% of the sample mean. In column (3) I
consider the two measures of community heterogeneity together. When doing so, the racial
fragmentation coefficient remains statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, while
the income inequality coefficient drops substantially and becomes insignificant. In columns
(4) and (5) I replace the Gini index with the Theil index. The results using the Theil index
are similar to those obtained using the Gini index. Individually, the Theil index is negatively
and significantly correlated with trust at the 95% confidence level. When considered along
with racial fragmentation it becomes insignificant and only the racial fragmentation coefficient
remains negatively and significantly associated with trust.
Overall, columns (1)-(5) confirm the results in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002): both racial
fragmentation and income inequality are negatively related to trust and, amongst the two, racial
fragmentation has the strongest relationship. This sets the basis for their claim that people are
more likely to trust others in an unequal city than in a racially fragmented one. This conclusion
however is challenged in columns (6) and (7), where I exploit the decomposability of the Theil
index. In column (6) I break down the aggregate income inequality into the two components
of between- and within- racial groups inequality. As it turns out, only the former component
has a negative and significant relationship with trust. The estimated coefficient implies that
moving from the community with the lowest racial income inequality (0.001) to the one with
the highest (0.061) reduces the level of trust by 11 percentage points. The null hypothesis
that the coefficients of between- and within- groups inequality are equal is rejected at the 99%
confidence level (t-stat 24.86), confirming that the disaggregated model is different from the
aggregated one. In column (7) I further add to the two components of income inequality the
index of racial fragmentation. Compared to column (5) the coefficient of racial fragmentation
drops by more than half and becomes statistically insignificant, while that of racial income in-
equality remains negatively and significantly correlated with trust at the 99% confidence level.
9
The estimated coefficient is sizeable: starting from the mean, a one standard deviation increase
in racial income inequality reduces trust by 2.8 percentage points, or 7% of its mean value. The
results in column (7) therefore suggest that it is not racial diversity per se to reduce the amount
of trust, but rather the concurrence of racial and income disparities in the community.
Table 4 investigates the robustness of this result to alternative definitions of racial diversity.
I start by considering the possibility, suggested by Uslaner (2008) among others, that the index
of racial fragmentation represents a surrogate measure for the shares of minorities living in the
MSA. Since minorities are less trusting, the impact of fragmentation on trust may arise from
compositional effects. In columns (1)-(5) I thus substitute the index of racial fragmentation
with the shares of different racial groups living in the community. The estimates provide some
support for the argument. In particular, the coefficients suggest that trust is lower when the
shares of Black and Hispanic minorities are larger, albeit the coefficients are not statistically
significant. Also, trust increases for larger shares of the more affluent White and Asian groups.
Irrespective of the racial group considered, however, the coefficient of racial income inequality
remains negative and significant in all columns, suggesting that the measure is not simply a
proxy for larger population shares of groups with different levels of trust.
Columns (6) and (7) replace the baseline index of racial fragmentation with an index of
racial segregation.12 According to some authors, this is the relevant measure to consider when
discussing the detrimental effect of diversity on trust (Stolle et al., 2008; Uslaner, 2011). The ar-
gument is that while fragmented but integrated communities facilitate the repeated interactions
among races, potentially raising their mutual trust, segregation certainly reduces it by isolating
groups from each other and exaggerating their perceived differences. In line with this explana-
tion, column (6) displays a negative relationship between segregation and trust. The estimated
coefficient is significant at the 90% confidence level and implies that a one standard deviation
increase in segregation reduces trust by 3% of its mean value. The effect however becomes
insignificant in column (7) when I include the measure of racial income inequality, which in-
stead retains a negative coefficient significant at the 99% confidence level. This suggests that
the effect of racial income inequality on trust is not only related to the sorting of individuals of
different races across neighbourhoods on the basis of income. Indeed, the correlation between
racial income inequality and segregation in the sample is only slightly positive (0.11). This is
consistent with the theoretical results of Sethi and Somanathan (2004), who show that segrega-
tion happens at both high and low levels of racial income inequality if individuals care about
the affluence and the racial composition of their neighborhoods.
In Table 5 I check the robustness of the main result to alternative treatments of the time
dimension. Columns (1) and (2) replace the state and year fixed effects with state-year fixed
12I use the entropy index calculated by Iceland and Scopilliti (2008). The index measures the percentage of one
group’s population that would have to change residence, in order for each neighbourhood to have the same
percentage of that racial group as the MSA overall. The index ranges between 0 and 1. When all neighborhoods
have the same composition as the overall MSA, the index is at its minimum. When each neighborhoods in the
MSA is completely segregated, so that only one racial group is present, the index achieves its maximum.
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effects, allowing different states to follow different trends in the evolution of racial fragmen-
tation and racial income inequality. The specification exploits the cross-sectional variation in
each year between MSA belonging to the same state. The results are similar to those in the
baseline specification, except that racial fragmentation in column (2) retains a significant and
independent effect on trust. The income inequality between races also remains negatively and
significantly correlated with trust at the 95% confidence level. In the next columns I replace the
interpolated measures of racial fragmentation and income inequality with their original values
calculated at different Census years. Keeping the measures of community heterogeneity con-
stant reduces concerns of serial correlation introduced by the linear interpolation in the baseline
specification. Columns (3) and (4) assign the value calculated at the preceding Census year and
held constant over the following decade, while columns (5) and (6) assign the value calculated
at the closest Census year. The results are similar to those using the interpolated measures.
Racial fragmentation appears to be the only negative and significant predictor of trust when
considered along with aggregate income inequality in columns (3) and (5). Its coefficient, how-
ever, becomes insignificant when the income inequality is partitioned into between- and within-
groups inequality in columns (4) and (6). As in the baseline specification, only racial income
inequality remains negatively and significantly associated with trust. The point estimates are
similar to those obtained using the interpolated measures, suggesting that the variation is mostly
cross-sectional.
3.2. Instrumental variable estimation
The previous results are suggestive of a negative effect of racial income inequality on trust.
It is possible, however, that the causality of the relationship runs in the opposite direction, from
low levels of trust to high racial income inequality. The index of racial income inequality in
fact is increasing in the difference between the average incomes of racial groups, and such dif-
ference might itself be influenced by low levels of (interracial) trust.13 This would be the case
if, for example, employers engage in taste-based discrimination, preferring to hire individuals
of their own race (Giuliano et al., 2009; Stoll et al., 2004). Similarly, the index of racial frag-
mentation could also be influenced by the level of trust if discriminated minorities decide to
migrate towards other, more tolerant, communities. The least squares estimates would then be
biased, as greater racial income inequality and fragmentation might partly be the consequence
of low interracial trust in the MSA. I employ an instrumental variables procedure to address this
13The between-groups inequality in fact can be rewritten as:
BtwIneqm =∑
r
yrm
Ym
ln
( yrm
Ym
nrm
Nm
)
=∑
r
nrm
Nm
yrm
ym
ln
(
yrm
ym
)
(6)
where yrm represents the average income of race r in the MSA and ym is the average income in the MSA.
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reverse causality issue, using two separate instruments for the potentially endogenous measures
of racial income inequality and racial fragmentation.
I instrument the index of racial income inequality in each MSA with the volume of local
cotton production at the end of the 19th century. The instrument exploits the fact that labor-
intensive cotton production in the Southern “Black Belt” was carried out through the forced
labor of enslaved Black population. MSA in traditional cotton-producing areas were thus char-
acterized by a disproportionate share of poor Black population.14 This aspect has perpetuated
over time since the MSA continued to be heavily populated by the descendants of the Black
workers, even after the decoupling between cotton and Black labor due to the mechanization of
the picking process during the 1930s (Dattel, 2009). As a result, traditional cotton-producing
MSA are still amongst the most racially income unequal communities in the U.S.
The historical volume of cotton production is measured by the number of cotton bales per
Km2 in each MSA. The data come from the 1889 U.S. Census on Agriculture.15 The inclusion
of state fixed effects in the first-stage regressions implies that the identifying variation comes
from differences in the amount of cotton produced across MSA of the same state. The within-
state variation is substantial. For example, cotton production in Tennesse ranged from 13 cotton
bales per Km2 in Memphis to 2 in Nashville and 0 in Knoxville and Johnson City. These
historical differences translate into differences in current racial income inequality, which in
Memphis is 3 times larger than in Nashville, and 10 times larger than in Knoxville and Johnson
City.16
The instrument for racial fragmentation exploits the settlement patterns of immigrants based
on pre-existing clusters, as in Card (2001). In particular, I predict flows of Hispanic and Asian
immigrants based on their tendency to move to previously established enclaves. I thus multiply
the initial shares of Hispanics and Asians in each MSA in 1970 by their national immigration
inflows over the following decades, in order to obtain their predicted shares in each MSA. This
isolates the exogenous supply-push component of Hispanic and Asian population shares, which
are independent of MSA-specific levels of interracial trust. I then calculate a predicted racial
fragmentation index, by replacing the actual shares of Hispanic and Asian population with the
corresponding predicted shares based on earlier settlement locations.
The bottom panel of Table 6 reports the estimates from first-stage regressions. In all columns
the coefficients of the instruments are significant at the 99% confidence level. Columns (1) and
14While some Northern states (Delaware, New Jersey, D.C. and Maine) had an overall share of Black population
comparable to that in the South, their share of free (and presumably richer) Black population was much higher,
ranging from 46% to 98%, against an average 3% in the South (U.S. Census, 1850).
15The data are available at the county level from the United States Department of Agriculture. I attribute each
county to the MSA of belonging.
16The suitability of the soil for cotton production is related to the outcrop of sedimentary units during the Creta-
ceous era. Submerged areas close to the shoreline at that time were, 100 millions years later, especially suitable
for production. The shoreline curled through parts of the Southern states of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Tennessee, North and South Carolina, making some areas of these states highly productive while others much
less so. For a review of the relation between geological characteristics of the territory and a number of social,
economic and political outcomes, see the webpage of Prof. Steven Dutch.
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(2) show the independent effect of each instrument on the corresponding endogenous regressor.
The point estimate in column (1) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the predicted
racial fragmentation index is associated with an increase in the actual racial fragmentation
index by 30% of its average. The coefficient in column (2) instead suggests that MSA that
were one standard deviation apart in terms of cotton production in 1889, differ by half of a
standard deviation in terms of racial income inequality one century later. In numbers, this
means that MSA that were producing 360 cotton bales per 100 km2 (one standard deviation
above the average production), today are 31% more racially unequal than the average MSA.
Columns (3) and (4) include both instruments at the same time. Each instrument continues
to significantly predict the corresponding endogenous regressor, and the point estimates are
similar to the unconditional effects in the previous columns.
The upper panel of Table 6 reports the second-stage results. A comparison of the IV esti-
mates with their LS counterparts in Table 3 reveals that the point estimates are never markedly
different. If anything, the IV results in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the effects of racial
fragmentation and racial income inequality on trust are stronger (more negative) than what
suggested by the non-instrumented estimates. Both coefficients are statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level. In column (3) I consider the two instrumented regressors together.
As in the baseline LS regression, racial fragmentation becomes insignificant, while the index
of racial income inequality remains negative and significant at the 95% confidence level. The
causal IV estimate in column (3) thus implies that a one standard deviation increase in racial
income inequality reduces trust of 3.4 percentage points, or 9% of its mean value. All columns
report the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic for the first-stage regressions. In all specifications, the
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic exceeds the relevant Stock-Yogo critical values, indicating that the
instruments are strong predictors of the endogenous regressors. Since the value is close to the
threshold in column (3), as a further check I also report the p-value for the Anderson-Rubin
Chi-2 test, which is robust to the presence of weak instruments. In all specifications, the test
clearly rejects the hypothesis that racial income inequality does not affect trust. Overall, the IV
results confirm the negative effect of racial income inequality on trust, and suggest that the ef-
fect is not driven by reverse causation from low (interracial) trust to high inequality of average
incomes across racial groups. Since the LS results provide a conservative estimate of the true
effect, in the remainder I continue to present them along with the IV results, in order to show
the consistency between the two sets of results.
4. Possible Channels
4.1. Interracial competition
One way to interpret the negative effect of racial income inequality on trust is to argue that
individuals have prejudices and classify others on the basis of social stereotypes. This view is
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consistent with sociological theories of interracial group-competition (Blumer, 1958; Blalock,
1967), which consider prejudice a defensive reaction from members of the majority group
against challenges to their privileged position. The greater the perceived threat, the higher the
hostility against threatening outsiders (Quillian, 1995). Under this interpretation, trust is lower
in more racially unequal communities due to the greater menace posed by minorities for ac-
cess to valuable resources, such as public education and welfare. This inter-group competition
would foster hostility and prejudices, ultimately reducing trust in others, who are more likely
to be of a different race and social background the greater the level of racial income inequality.
I start to investigate this explanation by testing one of its direct implications. If perceived
group threats were important, one would expect political attitudes and behaviors, especially
those concerning the allocation of resources, to be particularly disputed when racial income
inequality is high. In particular, affirmative action programs granting preferential treatment to
minority groups should find lower support in communities characterized by greater competition
(Sidanius and Pratto, 2001).
In Table 7 I thus consider a set of questions from the GSS which explicitly ask respondents
their opinion about the fairness of preferential policies, and check whether these opinions are af-
fected by the extent of racial income inequality in the community of the respondents. I presents
both LS and IV results for the full sample of individuals, as well as IV results for the sample
of White respondents only. Columns (1)-(3) start by asking in general whether the respondents
think that Blacks should overcome prejudice and make progresses without political favouritism.
In all columns the coefficient of racial income inequality is insignificant, suggesting that racial
disparities do not affect political views at this level of generality. Columns (4)-(6) more di-
rectly ask respondents their position about affirmative action policies. In this case the results
provide some support for theories of interracial group-conflict. In particular, the IV specifi-
cation of column (5) shows that opposition to affirmative action is stronger in more racially
income unequal communities. The effect however disappears in column (6) for the sample of
White respondents, who should instead be most concerned with race-targeted policies. Finally,
columns (7)-(9) ask whether affirmative actions penalize members of the White majority. Also
in this case, there is no evidence of a significant effect of racial income inequality on political
opinions, neither in the full sample nor among White respondents. Altogether, Table 7 pro-
vides very scant evidence to support the political implications of group-conflict theories. This
is consistent with the results of Oliver and Wong (2003) and Hopkins (2010), who also find no
significant effect of racial threats on individual political attitudes, contrary to initial research on
the subject (Pettigrew, 1959).
I complement this indirect (lack of) evidence with a more explicit test of the effect of racial
income inequality on prejudices and social stereotypes. To this end, I use a set of questions
from the GSS which ask to rate the characteristics of people in different racial groups. I focus
in particular on whether the respondents think that people in a certain group tend to be hard-
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working or lazy, as well as unintelligent or intelligent.17 I combine the answers and the race of
the respondents to construct four dummy variables, which are equal to 1 if the respondent thinks
that individuals of her own group or the other group are lazy or unintelligent. Simple mean
comparisons suggest that respondents have a worse overall opinion of people of a different
race, which are described as more lazy (12% vs. 3%) and unintelligent (18% vs. 6%) compared
to individuals of their own race. A mean comparison test rejects the null hypothesis of means
equality at the 99% confidence level (t-stats 22.4 and 21.6 respectively).
The question, however, is whether these stereotypes correlate with the level of racial income
inequality in the community of the respondents. This is investigated in Table 8, which reports
both LS and IV estimates for each set of results. I start by considering opinions about lazi-
ness. The first two columns focus on individuals of the same group of the respondent, while
the next two columns on individuals of the other group. The IV results in columns (2) and (4)
show that, in more racially unequal communities, respondents are more likely to consider both
same-group and other-group individuals lazy. The point estimate for other-group individuals is
twice as large as for same-group individuals, providing some support for the idea that stereo-
types are exacerbated by interracial group-conflict. However, neither of the two coefficients
is statistically significant, and they are not statistically different from each other. Columns
(5)-(8) consider opinions about intelligence. The LS results in columns (5) and (7) show that
respondents in racially income unequal communities are more likely to consider other people
unintelligent, regardless of whether they belong to their same group or the other group. Both
coefficients are significant at the 99% confidence, and they are not statistically different from
each other. In column (6), the IV estimate for people of the same group turns negative and
insignificant. For individuals of a different group in column (8) it remains positive, and larger
in magnitude compared to LS, but is also not statistically significant.
Altogether, the results in Table 8 thus suggest that people in racially unequal communities
have more negative opinions about their neighbours. This, however, is regardless of their group
of belonging and there is no evidence that negative stereotypes are particularly targeted to-
wards members of different racial groups. Together with the results in Table 7, this challenges
the notion that negative stereotypes emerge as a reaction to perceived threats from competing
different others, which in turn casts doubts on the idea that racial income inequality affects trust
due to greater interracial competition.18
4.2. Preference for similarity
An alternative explanation for the detrimental effect of racial income inequality on trust is
based on the observation that similarity affects the inclination towards others in several dimen-
sions, including the propensity to trust. This view has a long tradition in both psychology and
17The respondents are only asked about their opinion about Black and White individuals. I thus restrict the sample
to respondents belonging to one of these two racial groups.
18A similar conclusion is reached by Rudolph and Popp (2010) and Oliver and Mendelberg (2000).
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sociology (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; Coleman, 1988), where it is often reffered to under
the term of “homophily”.19 The observation is also supported by a large body of experimental
evidence (Glaeser et al., 2000; Bornhorst et al., 2010). Several factors can potentially account
for this in-group bias, including similarity in preferences and tastes as well as networking ar-
guments (Dixit, 2003; Tabellini, 2008).
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) suggest that homophily plays an indirect role on trust, by
determining the propensity of individuals to join associations, unions and religious groups,
whose social interactions are particularly conducive to generating high levels of interpersonal
trust and reciprocity. Under this interpretation, citizens of heterogeneous communities are less
likely to be members of a group and interact with individuals of different races and socio-
economic background. The lack of interaction exacerbates their initial aversion towards those
who are different, reducing their level of trust. One indirect way of assessing whether the
preference for similarity assumption holds in my data is therefore to check whether individuals
exposed to greater racial disparities are less likely to be members of a group.
Table 9 thus presents regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent belongs to a group, and 0 otherwise.20 The estimates in columns (1)-(3)
show that racial income inequality reduces participation. A one standard deviation increase in
racial income inequality is associated with a reduction in group membership by 3.4 percentage
points. The result also holds when I instrument both measures of racial income inequality and
fragmentation in column (4). Columns (5)-(7) compare the effect of racial income inequality
on group participation in three of the most common forms of organization: unions, church
groups and professional categories. The first two have a high degree of interaction amongst
their members, whereas the third has a very low level of personal interaction. In line with the
idea that individuals prefer to interact with their kin, the effect of racial income inequality is
large and significant for unions and church organizations, but not for professional categories.
While these results are broadly supportive of the mechanism highlighted in Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000), they don’t necessarily establish a link between the level of trust and the
preference for similarity of different individuals. A second and more stringent test comes from
observing the effect of racial income inequality on the level of trust of two sets of individu-
als with arguably different levels of homophily. I use questions from the GSS to construct an
indicator of the inclination of each respondent towards social and racial similarity. I measure
preference for social similarity from answers on whether the government should engage in in-
come redistribution to reduce inequality. I define a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for
those who prefer same-income others and are strongly against redistribution. The preference
for racial similarity is instead measured by answers to a set of questions regarding both ab-
19The etymology of the term is: homo = self and philìa = love. The term “homophily” was coined by Lazarsfeld
and Merton (1954). A review of the literature on homophily can be found in McPherson et al. (2001).
20About 70% of respondents report to be members of some group or organization. On average, respondents are
members of 1.75 groups. The most frequent are church-affiliated groups (34% of respondents), sports groups
(20%), professional societies (16%) and labor unions (15%).
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stract opinions and concrete behaviour towards different races.21 For each question, I define
a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for those who have a strong preference for same-race
others. Finally, I separate respondents in two groups: those who prefer similarity in at least one
of the two dimensions above, and those who don’t. If the preference for similarity assumption
were true, people in the first group should be more concerned by an increase in racial income
inequality compared to individuals in the second group, who have weaker in-groups feelings.
Table 10 reports the coefficients for the two separate groups, defined on the basis of differ-
ent combinations of preference for social and racial similarity. The results broadly support the
preference for similarity assumption. The coefficients for those with stronger in-groups feel-
ings are larger in magnitude in 7 out of 8 cases and the difference between the two groups is
statistically significant in 5 out of 8 cases. This supports the view that racial income inequality
affects trust more for individuals that are averse to social and racial mixing.
4.3. Characterization and testable implications
Models formalizing the preference for similarity assumption typically characterize individu-
als along one dimension: they are either similar in race or income (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara,
2000; Tabellini, 2008). The focus on racial income inequality instead entails that individuals
can be similar in more than one dimension: identical individuals have both the same race and
income level; partially similar individuals have either the same race or the same income; in-
dividuals that are different have no common element of similarity. This classification along
multiple dimensions carries additional insights on the underlying features of the preference for
similarity. A formal analysis is reported in Appendix A, which presents a basic two-groups
model of trust formation.22 Here I offer a heuristic discussion of the conditions that must be
satisfied in order for racial income inequality to reduce trust.
As a way of example, consider the two communities reported in Figure 2, where the popu-
lation is perfectly divided between Blacks and Whites, and rich and poor. The only difference
between the two is the way in which income is distributed across racial groups. In community
A, for both Blacks and Whites, half of the group is rich and half is poor. In community B, all
Whites are rich and all Blacks are poor. The empirical results in Section 3 show that trust is
lower in community B, where racial and economic identities coincide. Also, Figure 2 shows
that citizens of B face twice as many identical and different individuals compared to A, where
there is a larger share of partially similar individuals. These two observations combined imply
that the doubling of identical individuals in B - and the corresponding increase in trust - does
21The questions range from being favourable to interracial marriage, to having invited someone of a different race
at home for dinner recently. The exact definition for the questions included is reported in the notes to Table
10. The table includes all questions on racial attitude for which there are at least 1,000 respondents for each
group.
22Considering more than two groups would significantly complicate the analysis, without providing substantial
additional insights. The two-groups model approximates the composition of the GSS sample in which Whites
and Blacks account for roughly 90% of the total individuals (see Table 1).
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not compensate for the doubling of different individuals - and the corresponding reduction in
trust.
This suggests that citizens have non-linear preferences for similarity: their trust falls at in-
creasing rates as individuals become more different. This condition is derived analytically
from the model in Appendix A, and is graphically summarized in Figure 3. The x–axis plots
the dimensions of similarity among citizens in the community, while the y–axis plots the cor-
responding amount of trust. I define w2 as the amount of trust towards individuals similar in
both race and income, and w1 as the amount of trust towards those similar in only one dimen-
sion. The amount of trust towards individuals different in both dimensions is normalized to 0.
The key condition for individual trust to be consistent with the empirical results is w2 < 2w1,
reflecting the nonlinear relationship between trust and similarity. If this condition holds, then
for any given amount of racial fragmentation and overall income inequality, the level of trust is
lower when racial and income heterogeneity are combined rather than separated.
The non-linear preference for similarity carries additional implications that can be tested
in the data. The first implication, formally derived in Appendix A, is that racial income in-
equality is more detrimental in more racially fragmented communities. Intuitively this happens
because, in racially homogeneous communities, a larger number of individuals in the more
populous group become identical when racial income inequality increases.23 Clearly the situ-
ation is reversed for minority groups individuals, which are worse off compared to the case of
racially fragmented communities. Since they represent a minority of the population, however,
their weight in the overall level of trust of the community is smaller and the effect of the more
populous group predominates. For the community as a whole, therefore, increases in racial
income inequality imply progressively smaller reductions of trust as racial fragmentation de-
creases.24 Figure 4 shows this point graphically, by plotting the variation in trust due to a rise
in racial income inequality, for communities at different levels of racial fragmentation.
The implication is tested in Table 11. The first two columns distinguish between MSA below
and above the median level of racial fragmentation. Column (1) shows that the coefficient
of racial income inequality is insignificant in the sample of less fragmented MSA. For more
fragmented MSA in column (2), instead, the effect is negative and statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level. Compared to the average effect in Table 3, the estimated coefficient
is 25% larger and implies a reduction of 9% of the mean value of trust for a one standard
deviation increase in racial income inequality. Column (3) pools the observations together and
includes the interactions of racial income inequality with two dummies for the MSA being
above or below the median level of racial fragmentation. The results confirm that racial income
inequality reduces trust only in racially fragmented communities. The interaction term for
communities above the median is significant at the 99% confidence level. The result is also
23Note that the two hypothetical communities of the previous example, in which 50% the population belongs to
one race and 50% belongs to the other, represent the most racially fragmented communities one can think of
in a setup with only two racial groups.
24Indeed, the effect of racial income inequality becomes positive at extreme levels of racial homogeneity.
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confirmed by the pooled IV estimates in column (4): the interaction term remains very similar
in magnitude to the LS estimate and is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
A second implication of the non-linear relationship between trust and similarity concerns
the impact of racial income inequality on different racial groups of the same community. In
Appendix A, I show formally that minority groups are those who reduce trust most when racial
income disparities increase. Intuitively, this depends on the different population shares of each
group. The impact of racial income inequality is milder for members of the more populous
groups, because they have many individuals to become identical with - based on the definition
above - when racial income inequality increases. Minority groups members, instead, have fewer
individuals to become identical with, and a larger number of individuals who become different
in both race and income, when racial disparities increase. This implies a more pronounced
reduction in their level of trust, when racial income inequality increases.
The implication is tested in Table 12. I identify the race of GSS respondents and estimate
the impact of between-groups inequality for each of the different racial groups. The results
in columns (1)-(5) show a negative effect of racial income inequality on trust for all groups,
and confirm that the effect is stronger for racial minorities. In particular, greater racial income
inequality has a negative but not significant effect in the sample of White respondents in column
(1), while the estimated effect is 50% larger, and statistically significant, for the sample of
Black individuals in column (2) and four times as large for the group of Hispanic respondents
in column (5). In the case of Hispanics, a one standard deviation increase in between-groups
inequality reduces trust by more than 8%. The remaining minority groups, Asians and Native
Americans, have fewer respondents so that the estimated effect, while negative and with a large
point estimate, is imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant. Column (6) pools all
respondents together, interacting the measure of racial income inequality with dummies for
their corresponding racial groups. Under the pooled specification, for all groups except Native
Americans the estimated effect is statistically significant. The coefficient of Whites is the most
precisely estimated but its point estimate remains generally smaller compared to those of the
minority groups.
5. Conclusions
So far, the literature on the determinants of trust has neglected the role of income inequality
along racial lines. I show that greater racial income inequality lowers the level of trust in U.S.
metropolitan areas. Moreover, once racial income inequality is accounted for, racial fragmen-
tation becomes a statistically insignificant determinant of trust in U.S. metropolitan areas. This
suggests that it is not racial differences per se that matter for trust but racial differences that
coincide with income differences. The result provides important insights for the debate on the
workings of the American melting pot. In particular, it suggests that racial diversity is more
detrimental when associated with income disparities between races and that, similarly, income
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inequality is more harmful when it has a marked racial connotation. My empirical results are
consistent with a simple conceptual framework where trust decreases at increasing rates as in-
dividuals become more different. I also document empirical support for further implications
deriving from this assumption. In particular, I show that income disparities between races have
a more detrimental effect in more racially fragmented communities and that minority groups
reduce trust more than the majority group when the inequality between races increases.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Individual Characteristics
Avg. Std. Dev. Observations
Trust .381 .485 22804
Age 44.70 17.09 22804
Female .559 .496 22804
Educ≤ 12 years .204 .403 22804
Educ≥ 16 years .252 .434 22804
Log (Real Income) 10.03 .990 20499
White .744 .436 22804
Black .148 .355 22804
Native American .029 .168 22804
Asian .021 .145 22804
Hispanic .056 .231 22804
Full Time .516 .499 22804
Part Time .102 .303 22804
Religious .888 .316 22804
Married .515 .499 22804
Divorced .167 .373 22804
Member .697 .459 10620
Memb.Union .145 .352 10513
Memb.Church .331 .471 10536
Memb. Pro f . .166 .372 10508
Lazy own .030 .171 4696
Lazy oth. .115 .319 4696
Unint. own .061 .240 4087
Unint. oth .175 .380 4087
Black No Fav. .704 .456 4911
Oppose A f f . Act. .815 .388 4706
White pen. A f f . Act. .652 .476 5201
Community Characteristics
Rac Fr .403 .171 22633
Gini .419 .051 22633
T heil .340 .085 22633
Btw T heil .021 .015 22633
Wth T heil .318 .075 22633
Rac Seg .304 .125 22726
Ethn Fr .749 .102 22633
Rac Fr Pred .396 .167 22633
Cotton Bales (100′s) .999 2.64 22804
Log (Size) 4.14 2.13 22526
Log (median inc. w) 10.56 .513 22633
Log (median inc. b) 9.98 .569 22633
Log (median inc. na) 10.12 .653 22633
Log (median inc. a) 10.48 .618 22633
Log (median inc. h) 10.11 .494 22633
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Table 2: Correlations among Measures of Heterogeneity
Variables Trust Gini Theil Wth Ineq Btw Ineq Rac Fr
Trust 1.000
Gini -0.261 1.000
T heil -0.252 0.981 1.000
Wth Ineq -0.231 0.965 0.989 1.000
Btw Ineq -0.268 0.717 0.702 0.629 1.000
Rac Fr -0.266 0.612 0.578 0.511 0.719 1.000
22
Table 3. Baseline 1973-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LS LS LS LS LS LS LS
Rac Fr -0.221*** -0.162** -0.189*** -0.072
(0.039) (0.070) (0.065) (0.076)
Gini -0.691*** -0.236
(0.205) (0.284)
T heil -0.298** -0.039
(0.117) (0.152)
Btw T heil -2.059*** -1.814***
(0.367) (0.539)
Wth T heil 0.120 0.231
(0.143) (0.154)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056
Note: The method of estimation is Least Squares. The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors
clustered at the MSA level. The dependent variable is Trust, coded one for individuals who say they can
trust others, and zero otherwise (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). All measures of community
heterogeneity refer to the MSA of the respondent: Rac Fr is the index of racial fragmentation; Gini is the total
income inequality calculated by the Gini index; T heil is the total income inequality calculated by the Theil
index; Btw T heil is the income inequality between racial groups calculated by the Theil index; Wth T heil is
the inequality within racial groups calculated by the Theil index. All specifications include state and year fixed
effects. The measures of community heterogeneity are calculated from: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their construction are in Section 2. All regressions also include
the following individual controls: age, age2, log (real income), educ ≤ 12 years, educ ≥ 16 years, religion,
female, married, full-time, part-time, divorced, children, Black, Native American, Asian, Hispanic (Source:
GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010); as well as the following community controls: log MSA size, index of
ethnic fragmentation, log (median income) by race, log (median income)2 by race. Source: IPUMS 1% sample
of U.S. Census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000). ∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence, ∗∗ 95
percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table 4. Alternative Definitions of Racial Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LS LS LS LS LS LS LS
Btw T heil -1.524*** -1.775*** -2.083*** -2.027*** -1.863*** -2.077***
(0.544) (0.487) (0.385) (0.358) (0.421) (0.406)
Wth T heil 0.243 0.214 0.211 0.188 0.225 0.201
(0.153) (0.151) (0.149) (0.152) (0.149) (0.149)
Share w 0.106*
(0.056)
Share b -0.120
(0.082)
Share na 1.006
(1.053)
Share a 0.402**
(0.157)
Share h -0.085
(0.051)
Rac Seg -0.082* -0.019
(0.049) (0.046)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056
Note: The method of estimation is Least Squares. The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors
clustered at the MSA level. The dependent variable is Trust, coded one for individuals who say they can trust
others, and zero otherwise (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). All measures of community het-
erogeneity refer to the MSA of the respondent: Btw T heil is the measure of income inequality between racial
groups; Wth T heil is the measure of income inequality within racial groups; Share w is the share of Whites;
Share b is the share of Blacks; Share na is the share of Native Americans; Share a is the share of Asians;
Share h is the share of Hispanics; Rac Seg is the entropy index of racial segregation. All specifications include
state and year fixed effects. The measures of community heterogeneity are calculated from: IPUMS 1% sample
of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their construction are in Section 2. All regressions
also include the following individual controls: age, age2, log (real income), educ≤ 12 years, educ≥ 16 years,
religion, female, married, full-time, part-time, divorced, children, White, Black, Native American, Asian, His-
panic (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2008); as well as the following community controls: log MSA
size, index of ethnic fragmentation, log (median income) by race, log (median income)2 by race. Source:
IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. ∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent
confidence, ∗∗ 95 percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table 5. Alternative Treatment of Time Dimension
State Time Trend Previous Census Closest Census
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS LS LS LS LS LS
Rac Fr -0.309*** -0.148 -0.194*** -0.066 -0.198*** -0.054
(0.066) (0.090) (0.066) (0.083) (0.069) (0.083)
T heil -0.042 -0.082 -0.044
(0.184) (0.158) (0.168)
Btw T heil -2.254*** -1.763*** -2.083***
(0.682) (0.617) (0.561)
Wth T heil 0.317 0.109 0.255*
(0.215) (0.159) (0.151)
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State*Year FE Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056
Note: The method of estimation is Least Squares. The values in brackets are Huber robust standard
errors clustered at the MSA level. The dependent variable is Trust, coded one for individuals who
say they can trust others, and zero otherwise (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). All
measures of community heterogeneity refer to the MSA of the respondent: Rac Fr is the index of
racial fragmentation; T heil is the total income inequality calculated by the Theil index; Btw T heil
is the income inequality between racial groups; Wth T heil is the inequality within racial groups.
All specifications include state and year fixed effects. The measures of community heterogeneity are
calculated from: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their
construction are in Section 2. All regressions also include the following individual controls: age,
age2, log (real income), educ≤ 12 years, educ≥ 16 years, religion, female, married, full-time, part-
time, divorced, children, White, Black, Native American, Asian, Hispanic (Source: GSS cumulative
data file 1973-2008); as well as the following community controls: log MSA size, index of ethnic
fragmentation, log (median income) by race, log (median income)2 by race. Source: IPUMS 1%
sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. ∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent
confidence, ∗∗ 95 percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table 6. Instrumental Variable Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
Rac Fr -0.253*** -0.011
(0.054) (0.131)
Btw T heil -2.441*** -2.670***
(0.473) (0.956)
Wth T heil 0.179 0.304*
(0.152) (0.162)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 36.64 56.24 7.56
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.001 0.001 0.001
First-Stage Regressions
Rac Fr Btw T heil Rac Fr Btw T heil
Rac Fr Pred. 0.743*** 0.636*** 0.048***
(0.123) (0.140) (0.010)
Hist.Cotton Prod. 0.265*** 0.205 0.186***
(0.035) (0.181) (0.040)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056
Note: The method of estimation in the upper panel is Two Stages Least Squares (IV). The
values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the MSA level. The depen-
dent variable in the upper panel is Trust, coded one for individuals who say they can trust
others, and zero otherwise (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). All measures of
community heterogeneity refer to the MSA of the respondent: Rac Fr is the index of racial
fragmentation; Btw T heil is the income inequality between racial groups; Wth T heil is the
inequality within racial groups. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. The
measures of community heterogeneity are calculated from: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Cen-
sus 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their construction are in Section 2. The bottom
panel reports the corresponding first-stage regressions. Rac Fr Pred. is the predicted index
of racial fragmentation, based on earlier settlements location of Hispanic and Asian popula-
tion. Hist.Cotton Prod. is 100’s bales per Km2, from the 1889 U.S. Census on Agriculture.
Further details on the construction of the instruments are in Section 3.2. All regressions
also include the following individual controls: age, age2, log (real income), educ≤ 12 years,
educ ≥ 16 years, religion, female, married, full-time, part-time, divorced, children, White,
Black, Native American, Asian, Hispanic (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010);
as well as the following community controls: log MSA size, index of ethnic fragmentation,
log (median income) by race, log (median income)2 by race. Source: IPUMS 1% sample
of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. ∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent
confidence, ∗∗ 95 percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table 9. Membership in Associations
Member of at least one association Unions Church Professional
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LS LS LS IV IV IV IV
Rac Fr -0.028 0.170 0.465* 0.088 0.680** 0.189
(0.089) (0.125) (0.267) (0.139) (0.318) (0.133)
Btw T heil -1.355 -2.219* -6.538** -3.844*** -7.117** -1.220
(0.983) (1.156) (3.043) (1.159) (3.472) (1.781)
Wth T heil -0.145 -0.234 -0.042 0.232 -0.270 -0.043
(0.277) (0.285) (0.363) (0.236) (0.399) (0.220)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 11.40 11.42 11.42 11.42
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.035 0.000 0.018 0.258
Observations 12,597 12,597 12,597 12,597 12,493 12,515 12,486
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is Least Squares (LS), in columns (4)-(7) is Two Stages Least Squares
(IV). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the MSA level. The dependent variable in
columns (1)-(4) is Membership, coded one for individuals who are members of at least one group, and zero otherwise
(Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). Columns (5)-(7) refer to membership in specific groups. All measures
of community heterogeneity refer to the MSA of the respondent: Rac Fr is the index of racial fragmentation; Btw T heil
is the measure of income inequality between racial groups; Wth T heil is the measure of income inequality within racial
groups. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. The measures of community heterogeneity are calculated
from: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their construction are in Section 2.
All regressions also include the following individual controls: age, age2, log (real income), educ ≤ 12 years, educ ≥ 16
years, religion, female, married, full-time, part-time, divorced, children, White, Black, Native American, Asian, Hispanic
(Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2008); as well as the following community controls: log MSA size, index of
ethnic fragmentation, log (median income) by race, log (median income)2 by race. Source: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S.
Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. ∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence, ∗∗ 95 percent confidence,
∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table 10. Racial Income Inequality and Preference for Similarity
IV coeff. of Btw T heil β0 = β1 Fraction of Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yes No
[1]
Against redistribution/
Against interracial marriage -9.202*** -0.921 0.09 0.26
(3.388) (1.813)
[2]
Against redistribution/
Racist has right to teach -1.855 -1.687 0.46 0.51
(1.756) (1.839)
[3]
Against redistribution/
Whites have right to
segregated neighborhood
-13.333** -3.288* 0.01 0.19
(5.228) (1.918)
[4]
Against redistribution/
No opposite race for dinner -5.046** -2.018 0.10 0.64
(2.502) (4.719)
[5]
Against redistribution/
Black should not push -6.830 -6.171* 0.05 0.29
(4.532) (3.718)
[6]
Against redistribution/
Against children to school
with opposite race
-2.238 -5.222 0.18 0.43
(4.633) (4.645)
[7]
Against redistribution/
Against busing -5.440* -2.885 0.02 0.66
(2.927) (5.351)
[8]
Against redistribution/
Allow racist books -3.002 -1.728 0.21 0.40
(2.598) (1.922)
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(2) is Two Stages Least Squares (IV). Column (1) reports
the coefficient of Btw T heil for the sample of respondents with strong in-group preferences; column
(2) for the sample of respondents with weak in-group preferences. Column (3) tests whether the two
coefficients are statistically different. Column (4) reports the fraction of individuals with strong in-group
preferences, for each separate question. All regressions include the full set of individual and community
controls used in the baseline specification, as well as state and year fixed effects. Against redistribution
is coded one for individuals who say that “the government should not concern itself with reducing
income difference between the rich and the poor”. In each row, this variable is matched with a dummy
variable reflecting interracial attitudes. In [1] the dummy is equal to one if the respondent thinks that
“there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites”. In [2] if the respondent thinks that
“a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior should be allowed to teach in a college or
university”. In [3] if the respondent agrees strongly that “white people have a right to keep blacks out of
their neighborhoods if they want to, and blacks should respect that right”. In [4] if “during the last few
years, no one in the respondent’s family has brought a friend of the opposite race home for dinner”. In
[5] if the respondent agrees strongly that “blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted”.
In [6] if the respondent “would have any objection to sending his/her children to a school where half of
the children are of the opposite race”. In [7] if the respondent “in general opposes the busing of black
and white school children from one school district to another”. In [8] if the respondent thinks that “racist
books should be allowed in libraries”. ∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence,
∗∗ 95 percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table 11. Racial Income Inequality and Fractionalization
Below Median Above Median Pooled Below-Above
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LS LS LS IV
Rac Fr -0.087 -0.196
(0.120) (0.131)
Btw T heil 1.759 -2.277**
(1.482) (1.095)
Wth T heil -0.014 0.269
(0.261) (0.218)
Rac Fr bel -0.119 0.275
(0.093) (0.317)
Rac Fr abo -0.183 -0.094
(0.117) (0.230)
Btw T heil bel 1.169 -7.904
(1.305) (6.117)
Btw T heil abo -2.036*** -2.081*
(0.498) (1.174)
Wth T heil bel -0.134 0.596
(0.192) (0.617)
Wth T heil abo 0.307** 0.440**
(0.140) (0.202)
Below 0.250*** 0.034
(0.095) (0.176)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 2.141
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.002
Observations 10,442 9,614 20,056 20,056
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(3) is Least Squares (LS), in column (4) is Two Stages
Least Squares (IV). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the MSA level.
The dependent variable is Trust, coded one for individuals who say they can trust others, and zero oth-
erwise (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). All measures of community heterogeneity refer
to the MSA of the respondent: Rac Fr is the index of racial fragmentation; Btw T heil is the income
inequality between racial groups; Wth T heil is the inequality within racial groups. Below is a dummy
variable equal to one if the MSA level of racial fragmentation is below the median, and zero otherwise.
RacFrbel , Btw T heilbel , Wth T heilbel are the measures of community heterogeneity interacted with the
dummy Below. RacFrabo, Btw T heilabo, Wth T heilabo are the corresponding measures for MSA above
the median level of racial fragmentation. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. The
measures of community heterogeneity are calculated from: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970,
1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their construction are in Section 2. All regressions also include the
following individual controls: age, age2, log (real income), educ≤ 12 years, educ≥ 16 years, religion,
female, married, full-time, part-time, divorced, children, White, Black, Native American, Asian, His-
panic (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010); as well as the following community controls: log
MSA size, index of ethnic fragmentation, log (median income) by race, log (median income)2 by race.
Source: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. ∗Significantly different from zero
at the 90 percent confidence, ∗∗ 95 percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table 12. Racial Income Inequality and Size of the Groups
Whites Blacks Ind Am Asian Hispanic Pooled Races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS LS LS LS LS LS
Rac Fr -0.075 -0.275* 0.810* 0.200 0.240
(0.099) (0.166) (0.436) (0.909) (0.281)
Btw T heil -1.758** -0.525 -6.497* -8.133* -5.142***
(0.713) (1.066) (3.316) (4.433) (1.773)
Wth T heil 0.305* 0.085 -0.781 1.508 0.932
(0.177) (0.335) (0.941) (1.404) (0.644)
Btw T heil w -1.718***
(0.591)
Btw T heil b -1.521*
(0.789)
Btw T heil na -2.454
(1.739)
Btw T heil a -4.259*
(2.149)
Btw T heil h -2.361**
(1.140)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,015 2,887 592 421 1,141 20,056
Note: The method of estimation is Least Squares. The values in brackets are Huber robust standard
errors clustered at the MSA level. The dependent variable is Trust, coded one for individuals who
say they can trust others, and zero otherwise (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). All mea-
sures of community heterogeneity refer to the MSA of the respondent: Rac Fr is the index of racial
fragmentation; Btw T heil is the measure of income inequality between racial groups; Wth T heil is the
measure of income inequality within racial groups; Btw T heilw is the interaction of the income in-
equality between racial groups with the dummy variable White, equal to one if the individual identifies
himself as White. Same definition applies to Btw T heilb, Btw T heilna, Btw T heila and Btw T heilh,
which are interacted with the corresponding racial identity dummies. All specifications include state
and year fixed effects. The measures of community heterogeneity are calculated from: IPUMS 1%
sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their construction are in Section 2.
All regressions also include the following individual controls: age, age2, log (real income), educ ≤ 12
years, educ≥ 16 years, religion, female, married, full-time, part-time, divorced, children, White, Black,
Native American, Asian, Hispanic (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010); as well as the follow-
ing community controls: log MSA size, index of ethnic fragmentation, log (median income) by race,
log (median income)2 by race. Source: IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000.
∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence, ∗∗ 95 percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent
confidence.
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Figure 1 A. Similar Characteristics but Different Trust
Figure 1 B. Are They Really Similar?
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Figure 2. Two Hypothetical Communities
Community A
White Black Tot. Ineq.
Rich 25 25 50
Poor 25 25 50
Rac. Fr. 50 50
Community B
White Black Tot. Ineq.
Rich 50 0 50
Poor 0 50 50
Rac. Fr. 50 50
Figure 3. Trust and Dimensions of Similarity
Figure 4. Plot of ∆1 at different levels of p
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Appendix to
Trust and Racial Income Inequality: Evidence from the U.S.
A. Formal conceptual framework
I consider a community consisting of two racial groups, labelled by i = 1,2. I suppose that
there is a fraction p∈ [0,1] of individuals belonging to the first racial group and a fraction 1− p
of individuals of the second. Therefore, the level of racial fragmentation of the community is
represented by the parameter p: increasing p from 0 to 1/2, the racial fragmentation increases
from the minimum to the maximum value.
To introduce the within-groups inequality I suppose that within each racial group there is a
fraction αi of rich and a fraction 1−αi of poor (αi ∈ [0,1]; i = 1,2). For the rich the level of
income is assumed to be the same, and similarly for the poor. I shall be particularly interested
in two extreme cases:
(i) α1 = 1, α2 = 0 (or α1 = 0, α2 = 1): in this case the between-groups inequality is maxi-
mum, whereas the within-groups inequality is minimum;
(ii) α1 = α2 = 1/2: conversely, in this case the between-groups inequality is minimum,
whereas the within-groups inequality is maximum.
For every racial group, I shall denote by ω2 > 0 the level of trust of each individual towards
another individual both of the same race and of the same income. On the other hand, I shall
denote by ω1 > 0 the level of trust towards another individual either of the same race, yet of
different income, or of the same income, yet of different race.25 Clearly, it is natural to assume
ω2 >ω1, as I do in the following. Finally, I suppose to be equal to zero the level of trust towards
individuals both of different race and of different income.
On these grounds, the expected trust level from a random match for a rich belonging to the
first racial group is the following:
W (r)1 = [α1ω2+(1−α1)ω1] p+α2ω1(1− p) ,
whereas for a rich belonging to the second racial group is:
W (r)2 = [α2ω2+(1−α2)ω1] (1− p)+α1ω1 p .
25This assumption is only made for simplicity. A third level of trust ω3 6= ω1, towards individuals of the same
income but of different race, could be easily dealt with.
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Similarly, the expected trust levels for the poor belonging to each racial group are, respectively:
W (p)1 = [(1−α1)ω2+α1ω1] p+(1−α2)ω1(1− p) ,
and:
W (p)2 = [(1−α2)ω2+α2ω1] (1− p)+(1−α1)ω1 p .
Clearly, the share of rich individuals belonging to the first racial group in the total population
of the community is α1 p, whereas the share of the poor of the same racial group is (1−α1)p.
Therefore, the expected trust level W1 of the first racial group is obtained multiplying W
(r)
1 by
the population share α1 p and W
(p)
1 by the population share (1−α1)p and summing over the
two terms. This gives:
W1 =
{[
α21 +(1−α1)2
]
ω2+2α1(1−α1)ω1
}
p2+[α1α2+(1−α1)(1−α2)]ω1 p(1− p) .
Similarly, the expected trust level W2 of the second racial group is obtained multiplying W
(r)
2 by
the population share α2(1− p) and W (p)2 by the population share (1−α2)(1− p) and summing
over the two terms. This gives:
W2 =
{[
α22 +(1−α2)2
]
ω2+2α2(1−α2)ω1
}
(1− p)2+[α1α2+(1−α1)(1−α2)]ω1 p(1− p) .
Then, the total trust level W :=W1+W2 of the community has the following expression:
W =
{[
α21 +(1−α1)2
]
ω2+2α1(1−α1)ω1
}
p2+ (A.1)
+
{[
α22 +(1−α2)2
]
ω2+2α2(1−α2)ω1
}
(1− p)2+
+2 [α1α2+(1−α1)(1−α2)]ω1 p(1− p) .
In the following I address the dependence of W on the quantities p, α1 and α2, to investigate
how the total level of trust in the community is affected by different levels of racial diver-
sity, between-groups inequality and within-groups inequality. As observed above, increasing p
from 0 to 1/2 increases the racial diversity of the model community from its minimum to its
maximum, while changing the values of the couple (α1,α2) from (1,0) to (1/2,1/2) the limit
situations concerning between-groups and within-groups inequality are obtained. In this con-
nection, observe that for both (α1,α2) = (1,0) and (α1,α2) = (0,1) (i.e. when racial income
inequality is at its maximum) the total trust level is simply:
W˜ = ω2
[
p2+(1− p)2] .
Instead of studying the total trust level itself, it seems natural to address its change with respect
the extreme situation represented by W˜ .
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Thus I shall study the difference ∆1 :=W −W˜ , namely:
∆1 =
{[
(α21 −1)+(1−α1)2
]
ω2+2α1(1−α1)ω1
}
p2+ (A.2)
+
{[
(α22 −1)+(1−α2)2
]
ω2+2α2(1−α2)ω1
}
(1− p)2+
+2 [α1α2+(1−α1)(1−α2)]ω1 p(1− p) =
= 2α1(1−α1)(ω1−ω2)p2+
+2α2(1−α2)(ω1−ω2)(1− p)2+
+2 [α1α2+(1−α1)(1−α2)]ω1 p(1− p)
as a function p, α1 and α2. ∆1 thus captures the additional trust of the community when it
moves away from the extreme case of maximum racial income inequality. Observe that the
expression of W is invariant under the transformation p→ 1− p, α1→ α2, as it must be.
Another relevant quantity I shall address is the difference ∆2 :=W1−W2 between the trust
levels of the two racial groups, namely:
∆2 =
{[
α21 +(1−α1)2
]
ω2+2α1(1−α1)ω1
}
p2− (A.3)
−{[α22 +(1−α2)2]ω2+2α2(1−α2)ω1}(1− p)2 =
= 2α1(1−α1)(ω1−ω2)p2−2α2(1−α2)(ω1−ω2)(1− p)2 .
I shall now pursue the analysis under the following:
Parametric Assumption (A): α1+α2 = 1 (α1,α2 ∈ [0,1/2]) ,
The reason of the above assumption is that it is satisfied in the extreme cases (i)-(ii) men-
tioned at the beginning of this section - namely, (α1,α2) = (1,0) and (α1,α2) = (1/2,1/2). In
fact, if (A) holds, I can connect the case (α1,α2) = (1,0) to (α1,α2) = (1/2,1/2) by increasing
α2 from 0 to 1/2 (accordingly, α1 decreases from 1 to 1/2). Therefore, making assumption (A)
and increasing α2 from 0 to 1/2 is a simple way in the model to decrease the between-groups
inequality while increasing the within-groups inequality.
Observe that:
α1 = 1−α2 , 1−α1 = α2 if (A) holds .
Therefore, under assumption (A) the difference ∆1 becomes simply (see (A.2)):
∆1 = 2α2(1−α2)
{
(ω1−ω2)
[
p2+(1− p)2] +2ω1 p(1− p)} = (A.4)
= 2α2(1−α2)
[−2ω2 p2+2ω2 p+(ω1−ω2)] .
Let’s now make the following:
Parametric Assumption (B): ω1 < ω2 < 2ω1 .
If (B) is satisfied, it is immediately seen from (A.4) that the difference ∆1 vanishes at two
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values of the parameter p, namely
p = p± :=
ω2±
√
ω2(2ω1−ω2)
2ω2
.
The following result is also an immediate consequence of equality (A.4):
Let assumption (A) be satisfied. If (B) holds, the difference ∆1 is positive in the interval
(p−, p+)⊆ (0,1), zero at p = p± and negative elsewhere. Moreover,
• the interval (p−, p+) is centered at p = 1/2 and only depends on the values of ω1 and
ω2. It extends to the whole interval (0,1) in the limiting case ω1 = ω2 and shrinks to the
point {1/2} in the limiting case ω2 = 2ω1;
• for every fixed p∈ (p−, p+), the difference ∆1 increases when α2 increases in the interval
[0,1/2].
Figure 4 plots the graph of ∆1 at different levels of p. Is it worth noting that the region of
positivity of ∆1 (if (A) and (B) are satisfied) is centred at the value p = 1/2, namely where
the racial fragmentation is maximum. Given the definition of ∆1, this means that the benefit
of moving away from a situation of extreme racial income inequality is maximum when the
community is at the highest level of racial fragmentation. Clearly, the opposite is also true:
the reduction of trust due to increasing racial income inequality is maximum when racial frag-
mentation is at its highest. This result represents the formal counterpart of the first implication
discussed qualitatively in section 4.3.
Let’s now address the quantity ∆2. If assumption (A) holds, it reads simply (see (A.3)):
∆2 = 2α2(1−α2)(ω1−ω2)
[
p2− (1− p)2] =
= 2α2(1−α2)(ω2−ω1)(1−2p) .
Then I have the following result:
Let assumption (A) be satisfied and ω1 < ω2. Then for any α2 ∈ [0,1/2]
W1 >W2 ⇔ p < 1/2 .
Moreover, for every fixed p < 1/2 the difference W1−W2 increases when α2 increases in the
interval [0,1/2].
Thus, when racial income inequality decreases (i.e. when α2 increases) the minority group
increases its level of trust more than the majority group. Clearly, the opposite is also true:
when racial income inequality increases, the minority group reduces its level of trust more than
the majority group. This represents the formal counterpart of the second implication discussed
qualitatively in section 4.3.
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B. Within Groups Inequality
While the focus of the paper is on the effect of racial income inequality on trust, it is also
instructive to consider the role of income inequality within races. This sheds further light on
the assumption of preference for similarity. An increase in within-groups inequality has two
opposite effects on the level of trust of the community: on the one hand, it reduces it by making
initially identical individuals different in income. On the other, it increases it by making initially
different individuals similar in income. The overall impact is ex-ante ambiguous, and which
of the two effects prevails crucially depends on the exact income distribution of the different
racial groups. Irrespective of the distributional aspects, however, the impact of within-groups
inequality is comparatively more adverse in racially homogeneous MSA. Indeed, in the extreme
case in which all individuals belong to the same racial group, greater within-group inequality
only reduces the number of identical individuals, univocally decreasing the level of trust. In
racially fragmented MSA, instead, this negative effect can be partially or completely offset by
the increasing income overlaps between individuals of different races. Depending on the degree
of concavity of the individuals’ preference for similarity, the overall impact on trust in racially
fragmented MSA may even be positive.26
The impact of within-groups inequality on trust is investigated in Appendix Table A2. For
each respondent in the sample, based on the racial group of belonging, I calculate the income
inequality within his own racial group as well as the income inequality within the other racial
groups in the MSA. Under the assumption of preference for similarity, an increase in the former
is unambiguously detrimental for the level of trust of the respondent, whereas an increase in
the latter has ambiguous effects. Column (1) shows that only the own group inequality reduces
the amount of trust, while the effect of greater inequality within other groups is negative but
not statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the inequality within one’s
own group reduces trust by 1.7 percentage points, an effect that is significant at the 95% con-
fidence level. Column (2) adds the income inequality between racial groups, which is negative
and significant in line with the results from the baseline specification. The inequality within
one’s own racial group remains negative and significant at the 95% level. Column (3) adds the
index of racial fragmentation in the MSA, whose inclusion does not affect the point estimate
of own group inequality, which remains significant at the 90% level. Column (4) shows the
corresponding IV specification, which further confirms the detrimental effect of greater own
group inequality.
Columns (5) and (6) split MSA based on the difference between the income level of the
majority group and the other racial groups. The smaller this difference, the more citizens
should reduce their trust when income inequality within other groups increases. Indeed, in
the extreme case of all races having the same average income, greater inequality within other
26In this regard, the observation is consistent with the positive coefficients of within-groups inequality in columns
(3) and (4) of Table 11.
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groups would only increase the number of different individuals, unambiguously reducing the
level of trust. For citizens in MSA with large income differences between races, instead, greater
income inequality within other groups should be less detrimental and may even increase their
level of trust. In this case greater income dispersion within other groups raises the probability
of income overlaps between individuals of different races, increasing the number of partially
similar individuals. The results in columns (5) and (6) support the argument, both under LS and
IV: individuals in MSA with similar income levels reduce their trust when the inequality within
other races increases. The estimated effect is significant at the 90% confidence level. On the
contrary, individuals in MSA with large income differences between races increase their trust
when the inequality within other races increases, and reduce it when the inequality in their own
group increases.
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Appendix Table A2. Within-Groups Inequality
Below Above
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LS LS LS IV LS LS
Wth T heil own -0.162** -0.134** -0.123* -0.110* 0.019 -0.334***
(0.068) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.087) (0.086)
Wth T heil oth -0.106 0.042 0.090 0.123 -0.225* 0.468**
(0.095) (0.106) (0.113) (0.110) (0.122) (0.176)
Btw T heil -1.835*** -1.552*** -2.693** -1.313* -0.112
(0.431) (0.590) (1.109) (0.766) (0.940)
Rac Fr -0.072 0.006 -0.237** -0.103
(0.074) (0.142) (0.092) (0.125)
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 7.621
Anderson-Rubin p-value 0.001
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,056 20,056 20,056 20,056 10,180 9,876
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) is Least Squares (LS), in column (4) is Two
Stages Least Squares (IV). The values in brackets are Huber robust standard errors clustered at the MSA level.
The dependent variable is Trust, coded one for individuals who say they can trust others, and zero otherwise
(Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010). All measures of community heterogeneity refer to the MSA of the
respondent: Rac Fr is the index of racial fragmentation; Wth T heilown is the measure of income inequality within
the respondent’s racial group; Wth T heiloth is the measure of income inequality within the other racial groups,
excluding the respondent’s own group; Btw T heil is the measure of income inequality between racial groups. All
specifications include state and year fixed effects. The measures of community heterogeneity are calculated from:
IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. Further details on their construction are in Section
2. All regressions also include the following individual controls: age, age2, log (real income), educ ≤ 12 years,
educ≥ 16 years, religion, female, married, full-time, part-time, divorced, children, White, Black, Native American,
Asian, Hispanic (Source: GSS cumulative data file 1973-2010); as well as the following community controls: log
MSA size, index of ethnic fragmentation, log (median income) by race, log (median income)2 by race. Source:
IPUMS 1% sample of U.S. Census 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. ∗Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent
confidence, ∗∗ 95 percent confidence, ∗∗∗ 99 percent confidence.
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Table A1. MSAs in GSS Sample, 1973-2010
Name Avg. Trust Avg. Racial Fragm. Avg. Ineq. Respondents
Akron, OH .51 .18 .23 73
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY .47 .14 .27 106
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA .45 .13 .27 160
Anchorage, AK .31 .47 .27 52
Appleton-Oskosh-Neenah, WI .58 .04 .2 69
Atlanta, GA .37 .49 .34 397
Atlantic City, NJ .29 .37 .27 97
Austin, TX .38 .55 .44 88
Baltimore, MD .34 .44 .33 348
Bellingham, WA .51 .26 .35 115
Biloxi-Gulfport, MS .18 .35 .35 77
Binghamton, NY .4 .12 .31 91
Birmingham, AL .22 .41 .3 161
Boston, MA .44 .29 .38 406
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY .34 .22 .28 263
Burlington, VT .46 .05 .28 78
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC .33 .47 .34 453
Chicago, IL .38 .51 .33 1069
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH .37 .43 .47 161
Clarksville- Hopkinsville, KY .25 .35 .36 16
Cleveland, OH .36 .34 .31 300
Columbia, SC .37 .42 .35 85
Columbus, GA .24 .52 .38 108
Columbus, OH .31 .31 .34 360
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX .36 .51 .36 424
Dayton-Springfield, OH .45 .25 .28 109
Denver-Boulder, CO .47 .39 .34 420
Des Moines, IA .42 .11 .3 163
Detroit, MI .34 .41 .31 557
Eau Claire, WI .48 .08 .3 88
Eugene-Springfield, OR .5 .11 .3 109
Evansville, IN .37 .13 .31 54
Flint, MI .48 .3 .22 73
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood-Pompano Beach, FL .29 .53 .38 97
Fort Wayne, IN .5 .18 .27 156
Fresno, CA .35 .55 .32 176
Grand Rapids, MI .46 .26 .35 198
Green Bay, WI .43 .05 .2 19
Harrisburg-Lebanon–Carlisle, PA .42 .15 .25 79
Hartford-Bristol-Middleton- New Britain, CT .44 .25 .24 62
Houston-Brazoria, TX .3 .62 .37 490
Indianapolis, IN .37 .28 .29 142
Jackson, MS .17 .5 .37 99
Jacksonville, FL .4 .41 .31 88
Johnson City-Kingsport–Bristol, TN .31 .06 .3 104
Kansas City, MO .36 .27 .3 196
Knoxville, TN .39 .17 .34 178
Lafayette, LA .3 .42 .57 50
Lansing, MI .46 .27 .29 80
Lexington-Fayette, KY .5 .21 .5 16
Little Rock–North Little Rock, AR .35 .36 .27 82
Long Branch-Asbury Park, NJ .57 .22 .22 84
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA .35 .63 .4 1165
Lynchburg, VA .25 .33 .39 98
Madison, WI .54 .09 .28 131
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Table A1. MSAs in GSS Sample, 1973-2010 (continued)
Name Avg. Trust Avg. Racial Fragm. Avg. Ineq. Respondents
Manchester, NH .59 .08 .22 119
Memphis, TN .29 .5 .47 100
Miami-Hialeah, FL .2 .6 .38 207
Milwaukee, WI .52 .29 .28 131
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN .54 .19 .3 368
Modesto, CA .24 .52 .34 72
Montgomery, AL .14 .47 .35 125
Nashville, TN .39 .39 .41 307
New Haven-Meriden, CT .35 .28 .31 144
New Orleans, LA .36 .55 .42 215
New York-Northeastern NJ .34 .56 .38 2173
Norfolk-VA Beach–Newport News, VA .31 .47 .34 174
Oklahoma City, OK .38 .36 .32 247
Orlando, FL .36 .31 .29 100
Philadelphia, PA .37 .39 .34 683
Phoenix, AZ .44 .41 .33 362
Pittsburgh, PA .41 .17 .33 417
Portland, OR .48 .24 .32 279
Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, RI .48 .17 .3 98
Provo-Orem, UT .52 .13 .28 126
Racine, WI .53 .23 .19 74
Raleigh-Durham, NC .44 .48 .38 78
Reading, PA .52 .09 .22 84
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA .34 .35 .43 104
Richmond-Petersburg, VA .32 .46 .35 274
Riverside-San Bernardino,CA .44 .46 .28 192
Rochester, NY .44 .37 .35 252
Sacramento, CA .47 .43 .31 123
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI .56 .19 .29 119
St. Louis, MO .37 .32 .29 414
San Antonio, TX .38 .58 .43 64
San Diego, CA .42 .51 .38 323
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA .41 .61 .37 738
Santa Barbara, CA .49 .52 .45 70
Savannah, GA .22 .48 .45 89
Seattle-Everett, WA .48 .33 .32 261
Springfield, MO .5 .1 .35 76
Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee, MA .51 .19 .26 66
Stamford, CT .57 .23 .2 73
Syracuse, NY .4 .17 .34 59
Tacoma, WA .47 .22 .29 72
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL .35 .34 .38 266
Texarkana, AR .14 .36 .44 76
Topeka, KS .51 .28 .24 75
Tucson, AZ .29 .52 .39 68
Tulsa, OK .22 .42 .46 64
Tuscaloosa, AL .27 .46 .53 93
Waco, TX .27 .43 .36 173
Washington, DC .39 .56 .34 464
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Delray Beach, FL .39 .41 .44 41
Wheeling, WV .37 .06 .28 108
Wichita Falls, TX .39 .28 .28 79
Worcester, MA .4 .24 .37 163
York, PA .29 .07 .25 70
Youngstown-Warren, OH .35 .21 .22 92
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